EURECON Outputs
This page presents the latest updates about the work-in-progress of the EURECON team, its publications and presentations.
This page presents the latest updates about the work-in-progress of the EURECON team, its publications and presentations.
This chapter establishes the rationale for regulation of banking and financial activity and then traces the evolution of national banking regulation and supervision in a range of countries. Particular attention is paid to the contrasting models in Europe, the USA and the People’s Republic of China; as well as the particular challenges in the globalised financial markets since the 1990s.
This chapter argues that summits tried to foster trust both “internally” and “externally”: summitry aimed at developing not only trust among the leaders, but also crucially trust with regard to the Western (economic) system. These two ambitions represented a vital transformation of the international system in the 1970s and 1980s.
G7/8/20 summits are often accused of many ills: club of the rich, producers of pointless communiqués, unduly gigantic gatherings, over-prepared meetings and media-show events – in a word, useless. This chapter argues for a more qualified assessment of their added value to global governance. This chapter assesses multilateral summitry along three lines, examining respectively the process (the G7 as a diplomatic instrument), the outcome (what agreements G7s actually reached) and the counterfactual (what if the G7 did not exist?).
The traditional story of European monetary cooperation in the 1970s following the abandonment of the Werner Plan in 1974, most often told …
This chapter explores one of the very distinctive features of the organisation of G7 summits, namely the group of personal representatives, or ‘sherpas’. Following a prosopographical approach, the study highlights a number of common characteristics among sherpas, in spite of the potential heterogeneity of this group. It further underscores the ambiguity of the G7 as an institution as well as the web of complex relations in which the G7 has embedded itself over time.
Although its inception gave birth to lively debates and that it influenced the mode of decision making in the EEC, this chapter shows how the European Council found its place relatively smoothly in the Community decision-making process.
How did the emergence of the European Council (EUCO) affect an established order in a specific European policy area? This chapter shows the capacity of the EUCO, created in December 1974, to steer and change elements of the established order in one of these policy areas, namely European Political Co-operation (EPC).
Within the monetary sphere, the 1970s were characterised by the opposition between two strategies for integration at the European level: the “economists” vs. “monetarists” debate. This chapter concentrates on the specific case of the monetary initiatives taken by France in 1974 and 1975.