Franco-German relations as the ‘engine’ of European integration are widely perceived to have stalled in recent years. This policy contribution assesses what the Franco-German relationship can achieve, what its shortcomings are, and what it means for the wider governance of the euro area and the European Union.
This is not the first time that the United States has antagonised Europe. And Europe can provide an effective response to such external challenges when it stands united.
This chapter argues that summits tried to foster trust both “internally” and “externally”: summitry aimed at developing not only trust among the leaders, but also crucially trust with regard to the Western (economic) system. These two ambitions represented a vital transformation of the international system in the 1970s and 1980s.
G7/8/20 summits are often accused of many ills: club of the rich, producers of pointless communiqués, unduly gigantic gatherings, over-prepared meetings and media-show events – in a word, useless. This chapter argues for a more qualified assessment of their added value to global governance. This chapter assesses multilateral summitry along three lines, examining respectively the process (the G7 as a diplomatic instrument), the outcome (what agreements G7s actually reached) and the counterfactual (what if the G7 did not exist?).
As it begins its EU renegotiation, the UK risks antagonising even close allies such as Germany.
The traditional story of European monetary cooperation in the 1970s following the abandonment of the Werner Plan in 1974, most often told …